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Abstract This paper presents a game theoretic model that analyzes resource allocation
strategies against an adaptive adversary to secure cargo container transportation. The de-
fender allocates security resources that could interdict an unauthorized weapon insertion
inside a container. The attacker observes the defender’s security strategy and chooses a site
to insert the weapon. The attacker’s goal is to maximize the probability that the weapon
reaches its target. The basic model includes a single container route. The results in the basic
model suggest that in equilibrium the defender should maintain an equal level of physical
security at each site on the cargo container’s route. Furthermore, the equilibrium levels of re-
sources to interdict the weapon overseas increase as a function of the attacker’s capability to
detonate the weapon remotely at a domestic seaport. Investment in domestic seaport security
is highly sensitive to the attacker’s remote detonation capability as well. The general model
that includes multiple container routes suggests that there is a trade-off between the security
of foreign seaports and the physical security of sites including container transfer facilities,
container yards, warehouses and truck rest areas. The defender has the flexibility to shift re-
sources between non-intrusive inspections at foreign seaports and physical security of other
sites on the container route. The equilibrium is also sensitive to the cost effectiveness of
security investments.
Keywords Container security · Port security · Border security · Game theory ·
Risk analysis · Terrorism
1 Introduction
The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the perception of terrorism risk along the United
States (U.S.) borders. Since disrupting economy is a stated goal of al-Qa’ida (see Hoffman
2006), protection of critical nodes of the economy located along the borders has become a
priority. U.S. seaports that handle more than 10 million incoming overseas cargo containers
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each year (see GAO 2008a) are considered to be potential targets of a terrorist attack. As a
result, cargo containers that are indispensable conveyors of overseas trade have drawn extra
scrutiny during inspections at domestic seaports. However, protection of seaports requires a
system-wide approach that allocates security resources at multiple nodes of container move-
ment cutting across international borders. With this recognition, the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) adopted a multi-layered approach to counter terrorism. In this paper, a
game theoretic model is discussed to gain insights about how best to allocate resources to
protect U.S. seaports against a containerized weapon threat.
1.1 Background
Concerns about a containerized nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb attack are shared among
many academic scholars and security experts. The technology curve for building a nuclear
weapon may not be high enough to dissuade determined terrorists from building one (see
Bunn and Wier 2006; Martin 2007; Allison 2004, 2006; Cooper 2004; Langewiesche 2007;
Ferguson 2006 and Maerli et al. 2003). Material to build such weapons of mass disruption
are illicitly available as evidenced by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports
of nuclear smuggling around the globe (IAEA 2006). As described in the Department of
Homeland Security National Planning Scenarios released in April 2005 (see DHS 2005),
the weapon could be shipped in a container and detonated in a port complex.
Cargo transportation system involves multiple points where containers stop before the
delivery at destination. Various programs and initiatives have been developed by the U.S.
federal government to reduce the vulnerability at these points and deter terrorists from
weaponizing cargo containers. A brief summary of these programs and initiatives is in order.
In an effort to bolster security of cargo during loading and transportation phases, the U.S.
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) introduced the Customs-Trade Partnership
against Terrorism initiative. This initiative offers private companies expedited inspections at
U.S. borders in return for improving security of their supply-chains. A parallel initiative by
CBP, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), deploys non-intrusive inspection and radiation
detection equipment at foreign seaports that ship U.S.-bound cargo. Currently, 58 foreign
seaports that together handle 86% of inbound overseas cargo (GAO 2008a) are CSI partic-
ipants. The goal is to examine high risk cargo overseas by non-intrusive technology in the
presence of U.S. Customs personnel. The Department of Energy contributes to the overseas
non-intrusive inspection activities through its Megaports Initiative in which radiation portals
are deployed. The capabilities of Megaports Initiative and CSI were combined in 2006 to
meet the goal of scanning 100% of U.S.-bound cargo under the Secure Freight Initiative.
In this paper, ‘inspections’ refer to the sequence of activities performed at U.S. or interna-
tional customs to check the contents of cargo containers for discovering illegal radioactive or
nuclear material transported over the borders. Inspections include initial screening of cargo
manifests and other critical information to assign a risk score to a container, scanning of
containers by non-intrusive equipment and physical examinations carried out if the results
of the non-intrusive inspections raise suspicion that a threat item is transported. All cargo se-
curity initiatives and programs have been introduced to inspect a higher percentage of cargo
containers. However, the time required for physical examination of each cargo container ren-
ders it impossible to open 100% of all containers. Therefore, the backbone of cargo security
initiatives and programs is new security technology. Non-intrusive inspections are made pos-
sible by radiation portals, gamma-ray and X-ray scanners, personal radiation detectors and
handheld radioactive isotope identification devices. Most cargo containers are scanned by
radiation portal monitors at domestic seaports. In addition, high risk cargo is identified by
Ann Oper Res (2011) 187:5–22 7
the Automated Targeting System (ATS) that utilizes a complex algorithm and assigns a risk
score for each incoming cargo container. ATS uses cargo manifest information submitted
24 hours before the ship leaves the foreign seaport. If a container is identified as high risk,
then it goes through X-ray imaging to determine whether a threat item is transported.
1.2 Purpose and past related work
Despite all efforts to improve security of incoming containers at U.S. seaports, vulnerabil-
ities exist. The goal of this paper is to understand how system-wide resource allocation for
container security could be improved in an attacker-defender game setting. The interaction
between the attacker and the defender is modeled as a Stackelberg game where the defender
moves first to allocate security resources followed by an attacker move to send a weapon.
Since a single attack scenario is considered, the game ends after the attacker’s move. The
attacker may exploit the vulnerabilities to the risk of unauthorized tampering or insider help
when a container makes a stop at a warehouse, a container yard or a truck rest area. The
attacker may choose to insert a weapon at any one of these points in transportation. Under
such a scenario, the major policy question from the perspective of the defender is when to
interdict the attacker’s attempt if the target is a U.S. seaport.
There is a very rich body of literature applying game theory to homeland security prob-
lems (see for instance Kardes¸ 2007 for a review). Only the most recent and relevant work
will be mentioned here. Most studies address how the defender should allocate resources
among multiple targets to reduce the vulnerability to an attack (see for example Bier et al.
2007; Powell 2007; Golany et al. 2009 and Bier et al. 2008). Vulnerability is defined as
the probability of success to the attacker if an attack attempt is made. In Bier et al. (2007),
the defender allocates resources under uncertainty about the attacker’s valuation of targets
whereas in Powell (2007) the defender considers layered defense strategies with complete
information about the attacker’s payoff. Other studies allow attacker’s effort to have impact
on targets’ vulnerability as well (see Zhuang and Bier 2007 and Major 2002). On the other
hand, some Stackelberg game applications focus on protection of a single target through
randomized security layers (see Pita et al. 2008 and Paruchuri et al. 2008), and on protection
of multiple domains in which multiple attackers may operate (see Paruchuri et al. 2006a,
2006b, 2007).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes a simple ver-
sion of the model where the attacker could attack on a single container route with n sites.
Section 3 generalizes this analysis to multiple container routes each with a different number
of sites and characterizes some of the important properties of the equilibrium. Some policy
implications and further discussion are presented in Sect. 4.
2 Single container route
2.1 The model
Containers move through multiple modes of transportation and are handled by multiple
parties before they reach their final destination, which in this paper is a U.S. seaport. They
make multiple stops at foreign locations during their transport on highways, railroads or even
sea routes. They are vulnerable to tampering at sites on their route where they make stops.
Typical sites where containers stop en route are warehouses, container yards, intermodal
transfer facilities and truck rest areas. It is incumbent upon the defender, who is the leader
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Fig. 1 Container movement and
system parameters in a single
container route model
in the Stackelberg game considered here, to improve physical security at these sites and to
reduce the likelihood of unauthorized tampering. Furthermore, the defender could allocate
resources to install in-box sensors that could detect threat items inside containers and to
enhance non-intrusive weapon interdiction capabilities at seaports. Each security investment
decision introduces another layer of security. The follower in the game is the attacker who
can observe the defender’s actions and chooses a vulnerable site where a container of choice
is tampered. The attacker plans to ship a nuclear weapon targeting a major U.S. seaport. If
the nuclear weapon reaches its final target and is successfully detonated, the defender incurs
a loss of e ∈ R+. A loss of e ∈ R+ represents the economic consequences that the defender
suffers after a successful attack. The attacker’s gain from a successful attack is equal to the
defender’s loss.
The entire cargo container movement realm is represented as a discrete set of sites where
each site is a candidate location for weapon insertion. Figure 1 represents the model for a
single container route. A summary of the game based on a single container route is given in
Fig. 2. On their route, containers move sequentially starting from site 1 and ending at site n,
which a U.S. seaport. Sites 1 to n − 2 represent warehouses, container yards, intermodal
transfer facilities and truck rest areas where each container makes a stop. The last two sites
(n − 1 and n) are the foreign seaport and the domestic seaport, respectively. The single
container route model essentially represents the cargo container movement system assuming
that every container arriving at the U.S. seaport visits the same sites abroad. It does not
represent a system in which only one container moves. Instead, multiple containers move
on the same route, and any one of these containers could be selected for weapon insertion
by the attacker while it visits some site i ′ ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. In other words, the attacker can
choose to insert the weapon into an arbitrary container at one of the sites from 1 to n−1. The
defender, in a leader role, does not observe the choice of i ′. Hence, the defender implements
physical security measures (i.e., install video cameras, build fences or employ guards) at
each site i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} to interdict the attacker if an attempt to insert the weapon is
made at site i. In Fig. 1, pi is the probability that the attacker’s attempt to insert a weapon
at site i is interdicted with physical security measures implemented at the site.
Physical security at sites 1 to n−1 is the first layer of security. The second layer is in-box
sensor technology. The defender could equip all cargo containers with in-box sensor tech-
nology as discussed in Cohen (2006). Even if the attacker successfully inserts the weapon
into a container, the attempt could later be detected with sensor technologies installed in-
side this container. The probability of interdiction with sensor technology is q . Note that,
q does not depend on where the weapon is inserted. Non-intrusive technology deployed at
foreign and domestic seaports constitute the third and fourth layers of security, respectively.
Non-intrusive equipment deployed at seaports include gamma-ray and X-ray scanners, ra-
diation portal monitors, personal radiation detectors and other handheld detection devices.
This paper does not focus on optimal inspection strategies employed at seaports. Other stud-
ies discuss optimal inspection strategies that utilize a series of non-intrusive scanners (see
Elsayed et al. 2007; Boros et al. 2006 and Wein et al. 2006), and their operational impacts
(see Bakshi et al. 2009). At a foreign seaport, the probability of interdiction is d1. On the
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other hand, the parameter d is defined for the probability of interdiction at a domestic sea-
port.
The weapon can reach its target at a U.S. seaport if and only if interdiction through the
first three security layers fail. When the weapon reaches a U.S. seaport, the attacker makes
an attempt to detonate the weapon remotely before inspections take place. This attempt suc-
ceeds with probability s. In case the remote detonation attempt fails, the attacker makes a
second attempt after the inspections and this attempt is assumed to succeed with probabil-
ity ρ. The second attempt is assumed to be made in the presence of the attacker. Hence,
ρ > s. As such, πi , the probability that the attacker successfully executes the attack after
inserting the weapon at site i is calculated as:
πi = P (Weapon inserted at site i) · P (No detection by in-box sensor technology)
· P (No detection at a foreign seaport) · [P (Successful remote detonation)
+ P (Remote detonation fails) · P (No detection at a U.S. seaport)
· P (Successful detonation in the presence of an attacker)]
= (1 − pi) · (1 − q) · (1 − d1) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ].
Better security does not come free to the defender. The defender incurs a cost c(pi)
to maintain an interdiction probability pi at site i. Hence, we assume that the probabil-
ity of success to the attacker solely depends on the defender’s effort to improve security
at site i. Bier et al. (2007) uses a logarithmic function to express this relationship (i.e.
c(pi) = − ln(1 − pi)). For analytical convenience, we use a reciprocal function for the cost
of improving physical security at site i, which is c(pi) = (1/(1 −pi)αi )− 1. This reciprocal
function captures some of the nice properties of the logarithmic function used in Bier et al.
(2007) such as
c(0) = 0, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0 and lim
pi→1
c(pi) = +∞.
The condition on c′′ is a mathematical statement of the assumption that it should get more
difficult to increase pi further at higher values of pi . In addition, the parameter αi is in-
troduced to model the impact of technology. Through parameter αi , we establish the rela-
tionship between the marginal cost of maintaining an interdiction probability pi based on
the effectiveness of the technology in use. Note that, c′(pi) = αi/(1 − pi)(αi+1) which is
increasing in αi . The higher the value of αi is, the higher is the cost of maintaining pi and
the marginal cost of increasing pi . Therefore, a high value of αi models a rather ineffective
technology where the defender should incur a high cost of maintaining pi . Another conve-
nience of the reciprocal function is that the empirical estimation of αi can be made through
linear regression. Estimation of pi is more difficult because it may require an extensive eval-
uation by the subject matter experts on the potential ways to breach a given level of physical
security.
The reciprocal function is used for modeling the cost for other layers as well. The cost
of installing in-box sensor technology is c(q) = (1/(1 − q)β) − 1. Non-intrusive technol-
ogy cost has different technology parameters for the foreign and the domestic seaport. In
particular, c(d1) = (1/(1 − d1)γ1) − 1 and c(d) = (1/(1 − d)γ ) − 1. In response to the de-
fender resource allocation strategy, the attacker chooses to insert the weapon at site i ′ where
πi′ = maxi∈{1,...,n−1} πi . Then, by multiplying πi′ with e, the economic consequences after
a successful attack, we compute the expected payoff to the risk neutral attacker by choos-
ing site i ′ as πi′ · e. The defender knows the attacker’s objective as well and chooses the
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Table 1 Summary of notation
pi The probability that the attacker’s attempt to insert a weapon at site i is interdicted.
q The probability that the weapon is detected by in-box sensor technology.
d1 The probability that non-intrusive inspections at a foreign seaport detect the weapon.
d The probability that inspections at a domestic seaport detect the weapon.
e Loss incurred by the defender if the weapon is detonated.
c(pi) Cost of maintaining pi at site i.
c(q) Cost of maintaining q through in-box sensors.
c(d1) Cost of maintaining d1 at a foreign seaport.
c(d) Cost of maintaining d at a domestic seaport.
αi Technology parameter in c(pi).
β Technology parameter in c(q).
γ1 Technology parameter in c(d1).
γ Technology parameter in c(d).
πi The probability that the attacker successfully executes the attack after inserting the weapon at site i.
s The probability that the weapon is successfully detonated remotely at a U.S. seaport.
ρ The probability that the weapon is successfully detonated in the presence of the attacker at a U.S.
seaport.
resource allocation strategy to minimize the sum of the total cost of technology and the
expected attack consequences
L(p1,p2, . . . , pn−1, q, d1, d) =
n−1∑
j=1
c(pi) + c(q) + c(d1) + c(d) + πi′ · e. (1)
Since it is easy to characterize the attacker’s strategy, the rest of the discussion focuses
on the defender’s objective function in (1). Note that, πz ≥ πl if (1 − pz) ≥ (1 − pl), or
pl ≥ pz. Table 1 lists the notation that has been introduced so far in the context of a single
container route. In what follows, we focus first on the analysis of the problem with a single
container route including n sites (see Fig. 1). In Sect. 3, the model is generalized to include
multiple container routes, all leading to a target U.S. seaport.
2.2 Characterization of the equilibrium
In the single container route case, the defender’s problem can be written as,
L(p1,p2, . . . , pn−1, q, d1, d)
=
n−1∑
j=1
1
(1 − pj )αi +
1
(1 − q)β +
1
(1 − d1)γ1 +
1
(1 − d)γ
+ (1 − pi′) · (1 − q) · (1 − d1) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e,
s.t. pj ≥ pi′ ∀j = i ′ and j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. (2)
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It is possible to obtain an analytical solution to this non-linear problem, albeit without any
closed-form expressions for the optimal levels of decision variables. The first derivatives of
L(·) with respect to the decision variables are,
∂L
∂pj
= αj · (1 − pj )−(αj +1) ∀j = i ′ and j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1},
∂L
∂pi′
= αi′ · (1 − pi′)−(αi′ +1) − (1 − q) · (1 − d1) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e,
∂L
∂q
= β · (1 − q)−(β+1) − (1 − pi′) · (1 − d1) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e, (3)
∂L
∂d1
= γ1 · (1 − d1)−(γ1+1) − (1 − pi′) · (1 − q) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e,
∂L
∂d
= γ · (1 − d)−(γ+1) − (1 − pi′) · (1 − q) · (1 − d1) · (1 − s) · ρ · e.
First order conditions imply ∂L
∂pi′
= ∂L
∂q
= ∂L
∂d1
= ∂L
∂d
= 0 at equilibrium. Since ∂L
∂pj
> 0 ∀j = i ′
and j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, the unconstrained optimum is pj = 0. However, the constraint dic-
tates pj = pi′ . The next proposition proves that the solution characterized by these proper-
ties is indeed the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Let (p∗
i′ ,p
∗
j ∀j = i ′, q∗, d∗1 , d∗) denote the equilibrium values of the associ-
ated decision variables. Then, the equilibrium in the Stackelberg game between the attacker
and the defender in the case of a single container route satisfies,
αi′ ·
(
1 − p∗
i′
)−αi′ = β · (1 − q∗)−β = γ1 ·
(
1 − d∗1
)−γ1 ,
γ · (1 − d∗)−(γ+1) = (1 − p∗
i′
) · (1 − q∗) · (1 − d∗1
) · (1 − s) · ρ · e, (4)
p∗j = p∗i′ ∀j = i ′ and j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1},
Proof The optimal solution to the non-linear optimization problem in (2) is the equilib-
rium solution to the Stackelberg game, and the first order conditions of the problem imply
the functional relationships in (4). Hence, the proof requires the second-order sufficiency
condition that the Hessian of the objective function is positive definite. Since the objective
function is separable in pi′ and pj ’s where j = i ′ and j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, the Hessian in-
cludes only the second-order derivatives with respect to variables pi′ , q , d1 and d . Hence,
the Hessian H is
⎡
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
∂2L/∂p2
i′ ∂
2L/∂pi′∂q ∂2L/∂pi′∂d1 ∂2L/∂pi′∂d
∂2L/∂q∂pi′ ∂2L/∂q2 ∂2L/∂q∂d1 ∂2L/∂q∂d
∂2L/∂d1∂pi′ ∂2L/∂d1∂q ∂2L/∂d21 ∂
2L/∂d1∂d
∂2L/∂d∂pi′ ∂2L/∂d∂q ∂2L/∂d∂d1 ∂2L/∂d2
⎤
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
.
There are several ways to prove that Hessian is positive definite. The particular method
here is to show that all the upper left submatrices have positive determinants. First,
∂2L/∂p2
i′ = αi′ · (1 + αi′) · (1 − pi′)−(αi′ +2) > 0. Second, the 2 × 2 upper left submatrix
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determinant is
∂2L/∂p2i′ · ∂2L/∂q2 −
(
∂2L/∂pi′∂q
)2
= αi′ · (1 + αi′) · (1 − pi′)−(αi′ +2) · β · (β + 1) · (1 − q)−(β+2)
− (1 − d1)2 ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2 · e2
= (1 − d1)2 ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2 · e2 · ((αi′ + 1) · (β + 1) − 1
)
> 0.
Since the computation of the determinant of the 3 × 3 upper left submatrix and the entire
Hessian matrix is long, it is presented in the Appendix. Both determinants are positive.
Hence the stationary point as described by the first order conditions is a minimizer. This
completes the proof. 
The result in Proposition 1 has interesting implications. First, it states that in equilibrium
the probability of successful weapon insertion should be the same at each site. If unequal
security standards are implemented, then the attacker should exploit the vulnerabilities at
the least secure site (for example a cargo transfer facility) to insert the weapon rendering
the security measures at other sites ineffective. As discussed in Sect. 1, the Department of
Homeland Security introduced the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
initiative to incentivize companies to improve physical supply-chain security by offering
less scrutinized inspections at the border. The program was criticized in 2005 by the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office due to weaknesses in validation of security profiles submit-
ted by the participating companies (see GAO 2005b and GAO 2005a). In particular, it was
reported that the site visits which are required to validate the implementation of security
measures are challenged by staffing shortages and lack of criteria to determine the rele-
vance of selected sites for the security of container movement. While a later report in 2008
(GAO 2008b) praises the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency for the improve-
ments made, weaknesses still exist in validating security measures at supply-chain sites. The
result in Proposition 1 strongly recommends equal security standards at sites where contain-
ers are loaded and transported. Hence, CBP should continue its efforts to visit foreign sites
on a regular basis to ensure a minimum level of security.
The equilibrium results of the model recommend balanced spending on each layer of
security. However, there is a trade-off between dollars spent on each layer. For example, in
comparing the value of physical security of supply-chain sites and in-box sensor technology,
the technology effectiveness parameters αi′ and β are crucial. If αi′ > β , then in equilibrium,
(
1 − q∗)−β > (1 − p∗
i′
)−αi′
which implies 1 − p∗
i′ > 1 − q∗, or q∗ > p∗i′ . As such, in equilibrium the defender maintains
a higher probability of interdiction using in-box sensor technology when αi′ > β . This fol-
lows because the marginal cost of improving interdiction capability in any security layer is
increasing in the value of the technology parameter.
Another major implication is on the effectiveness of non-intrusive inspection technology.
The value of non-intrusive technology at domestic seaports depends largely on the attacker
choice of a target. If the attacker chooses to detonate the weapon at a major seaport, then
there is a chance that the detonation occurs before the non-intrusive inspections. This re-
duces the value of non-intrusive inspections at domestic seaports. In equilibrium of this
model we have,
γ · (1 − d∗)−(γ+1) = (1 − p∗i′
) · (1 − q∗) · (1 − d∗1
) · (1 − s) · ρ · e. (5)
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If the probability of detonation before inspections at a domestic seaport is high (i.e., s is
high on the right hand side of (5)), then the corresponding solution to d∗ in (5) is low. In
other words, the defender should focus on non-intrusive technology at domestic seaports if
the attacker’s remote detonation capability is not sophisticated enough to pose a high threat
to national security. Conversely, the first order conditions for other major parameters are,
αi′ ·
(
1 − p∗i′
)−(αi′ +1) = (1 − q∗) · (1 − d∗1
) · [s + (1 − s) · (1 − d∗) · ρ] · e,
β · (1 − q∗)−(β+1) = (1 − p∗i′
) · (1 − d∗1
) · [s + (1 − s) · (1 − d∗) · ρ] · e, (6)
γ1 ·
(
1 − d∗1
)−(γ1+1) = (1 − p∗i′
) · (1 − q∗) · [s + (1 − s) · (1 − d∗) · ρ] · e.
In (6), the right hand sides of all the equations are increasing in s. Similarly, the left sides
are increasing in the model’s decision variables (i.e., the left hand side of the first equation
in (6) is increasing in p∗
i′ , the second equation is increasing in q∗ and the third equation is
increasing in d∗1 ). This indicates an opposite relationship between the attacker’s capability of
remote detonation and the probability of detection at earlier stages of container movement.
If the attacker is believed to have a high remote detonation capability, then more emphasis
should be placed on interdiction before the weapon reaches U.S. shores.
Finally, a similar analysis of (5) and (6) suggest that the defender should maintain a
higher level of security at each layer if the expected economic consequences of a terrorist
attack are high. The sensitivity of the equilibrium probability of interdiction at each layer to
perturbations in expected economic consequences depend on the level of security at other
layers. If the security level at other layers is already high, then sensitivity to a change in
expected economic consequences is relatively low.
3 The general model
Suppose now that there are an arbitrary number of container routes in the system (see Fig. 3)
all ending at one U.S. seaport. Similar to the single container route case, there are multiple
containers moving through the system. However, in this section we drop the assumption
that all containers move on the same route visiting the same sites. We should restate one
modeling assumption here, though. Terrorists make an attempt to insert one nuclear device
in a container transported to a U.S. seaport at a site of their choice where containers en
route to the U.S. make a stop. The defender’s goal is to interdict the tampered container.
However, the defender does not know a priori the site of weapon insertion and thus the route
the tampered container uses to arrive at U.S. Hence, the defender has to consider improving
security at all the sites where containers en route to the U.S. make stops.
Containers may arrive at the U.S. seaport from one of the t foreign seaports. Associated
with each foreign seaport i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, there are a total of m(i) separate container routes.
As such, a container may use either one of the m(i) routes to arrive at foreign seaport i.
Each route is identified with the two-tuple (j, i) where j ∈ {1, . . . ,m(i)} and i ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
Similar to the single container route case, on each route (j, i), there are a total of n(j, i)
sites that a container makes stops and hence is vulnerable to tampering. The attacker can
choose to insert the weapon at any site (k, j, i), where k ∈ {1, . . . , n(j, i)}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m(i)}
and i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. In addition, the attacker has the option to insert the weapon at one of
the t seaports. In Fig. 3, the notation used to identify a foreign seaport i ∈ {1, . . . , t} is
(k, j, i) = (0,0, i).
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Fig. 3 Container movement and system parameters in a model with multiple container routes
The probability of interdicting the attacker’s attempt to insert a weapon at site (k, j, i) is
denoted by pkji . In plain words, pkji is the probability of interdicting an attacker attempt to
insert the weapon at the kth stop that the container makes as it is transported on the j th route
that eventually leads to foreign seaport i. When k, j = 0, the interpretation is much simpler.
Then, p00i is the probability of interdicting weapon insertion while a container makes a stop
at foreign seaport i. Parallel to the single container route case, the cost of improving physical
security at site (k, j, i) is expressed as a function of pkji as c(pkji) = (1/(1 − pkji)αkji ) − 1.
Again, the parameter αkji models the impact of technology. At a foreign seaport i,1 ≤ i ≤ t ,
the cost of non-intrusive technology is c(di) = (1/(1 − di)γi )− 1 where di is the probability
of interdiction and γi is the technology parameter. The cost functions for layers 2 and 4 are
exactly the same under this case. The attacker has a strategy in equilibrium to maximize the
probability of a successful attack by selecting an arbitrary container for weapon insertion
and tampering this container at site (ko, jo, io) where,
πkojoio = max
ko∈{0,...,n(jo,io)}
jo∈{0,...,m(io)},io∈{1,...,t}
πkji .
The expected payoff to the risk neutral attacker by choosing site (ko, jo, io) is πkojoio · e.
The defender knows the attacker’s objective as well and allocates resource to minimize the
probability of success to the attacker. Despite the generalization, the defender’s problem is
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quite similar to (2),
L(pkji , q, di, d) =
t∑
i=1
[[
m(i)∑
j=0
n(j,i)∑
k=0
1
(1 − pkji)αkji
]
+ 1
(1 − di)γi
]
+ 1
(1 − q)β +
1
(1 − d)γ + (1 − pkojoio ) · (1 − q) · (1 − dio )
· [s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e,
s.t. πkojoio ≥ πkji ∀(k, j, i) =
(
ko, jo, io
)
, i ∈ {1, . . . , t},
j ∈ {0, . . . ,m(i)}, k ∈ {0, . . . , n(j, i)}. (7)
Parameters q and d denote exactly the same quantities as in the previous section. The at-
tacker strategy to insert the weapon at site (ko, jo, io) renders non-intrusive inspections at
the foreign seaport io critical. In equilibrium, dio is the detection probability during non-
intrusive inspections at the foreign seaport that is on the weaponized container’s route. The
problem in the general multiple container route case is quite similar except the probability
constraint. The first order derivatives are
∂L
∂pkji
= αkji · (1 − pkji)−(αkji+1) ∀(k, j, i) =
(
ko, jo, io
)
, i ∈ {1, . . . , t},
j ∈ {0, . . . ,m(i)}, k ∈ {0, . . . , n(j, i)},
∂L
∂pkojoio
= αkojoio · (1 − pkojoio )−(αkojoio +1) − (1 − q) · (1 − dio )
· [s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e,
∂L
∂q
= β · (1 − q)−(β+1) − (1 − pkojoio ) · (1 − dio ) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e, (8)
∂L
∂dio
= γio · (1 − dio )−(γio+1) − (1 − pkojoio ) · (1 − q) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e,
∂L
∂di
= γi · (1 − di)−(γi+1) ∀i = io,
∂L
∂d
= γ · (1 − d)−(γ+1) − (1 − pkojoio ) · (1 − q) · (1 − dio ) · (1 − s) · ρ · e.
The equilibrium values for decision variables are given in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Let (p∗kojoio , p∗kji ∀(k, j, i) = (ko, jo, io), q∗, d∗io , d∗i ∀i = io, d∗) denote the
equilibrium values of the associated decision variables. The equilibrium in the Stackelberg
game between the attacker and the defender in the general case satisfies,
αkojoio ·
(
1 − p∗kojoio
)−αkojoio = β · (1 − q∗)−β = γio ·
(
1 − d∗io
)−γio ,
γ · (1 − d∗)−(γ+1) = (1 − p∗kojoio
) · (1 − q∗) · (1 − d∗io
) · (1 − s) · ρ · e,
(
1 − p∗kojoio
) · (1 − d∗io
) ≥ (1 − p∗kji
) · (1 − d∗i
) ∀i = io, (9)
p∗kjio ≥ p∗kojoio , p∗koj io ≥ p∗kojoio , p∗kjoio ≥ p∗kojoio ∀(k, j, i) =
(
ko, jo, io
)
, i ∈ {1, . . . , t},
j ∈ {0, . . . ,m(i)}, k ∈ {0, . . . , n(j, i)}.
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Proof The proof for the equilibrium values of pkojoio , dio , q and d is similar to the proof of
Proposition 1. These are the only parameters for which the first order derivatives in (8) are
equal to zero in equilibrium. Therefore, the major step in this proof is to show the positive
definiteness of the 4 × 4 Hessian for four variables as in the proof of Proposition 1,
⎡
⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
∂2L/∂p2kojoio ∂
2L/∂pkojoio∂q ∂
2L/∂pkojoio∂dio ∂
2L/∂pkojoio∂d
∂2L/∂q∂pkojoio ∂
2L/∂q2 ∂2L/∂q∂dio ∂
2L/∂q∂d
∂2L/∂dio∂pkojoio ∂
2L/∂dio∂q ∂
2L/∂d2io ∂
2L/∂dio∂d
∂2L/∂d∂pkojoio ∂
2L/∂d∂q ∂2L/∂d∂dio ∂
2L/∂d2
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
.
Positive definiteness of this Hessian is proved similarly as in the Appendix.
For other variables, we use the constraints πkojoio ≥ πkji ∀(k, j, i) = (ko, jo, io), i ∈
{1, . . . , t}, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m(i)} and k ∈ {0, . . . , n(j, i)}. As in the proof of Proposition 1, the
unconstrained minimum of variables such as pkji , ∀(k, j, i) = (ko, jo, io), i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, j ∈
{0, . . . ,m(i)}, k ∈ {0, . . . , n(j, i)} and di , i = io is zero. However, since πkojoio ≥ πkji
∀(k, j, i) = (ko, jo, io), i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m(i)} and k ∈ {0, . . . , n(j, i)}, their re-
spective equilibrium values have to satisfy the constraints given in (9). Note that the con-
straints in (9) should be satisfied to ensure that the attacker does not deviate from the equi-
librium strategy of inserting the weapon at site (ko, jo, io). In other words, the probability
of success to the attacker after inserting the weapon at site (ko, jo, io) should be greater or
equal to the probability of success after inserting the weapon elsewhere. 
In the general model, the physical security of sites on each container route is not necessar-
ily at a uniform level. When there is a single container route, the probability of interdiction
at each site is the same. With multiple container routes, we observe that a similar result holds
on container routes leading to the foreign seaport that the weaponized container visits. On
other parallel routes, the physical security level is dependent on the status of non-intrusive
inspection capabilities at the foreign seaport. For example, consider the site (k, j, i), i = io.
Any container that visits site (k, j, i) arrives at the foreign seaport i by definition. Then, pkji
and di satisfy,
(
1 − p∗kojoio
) · (1 − d∗io
) ≥ (1 − p∗kji
) · (1 − d∗i
)
in equilibrium. This inequality is satisfied in equilibrium because, by definition, inserting
the weapon at (ko, jo, io) should maximize the probability of success to the attacker. If this
condition is not imposed, then both pkji and di would be zero in equilibrium. It suggests
a trade-off between the physical security of sites on the container route and non-intrusive
inspection capabilities at a foreign seaport. If non-intrusive inspection technology is used
effectively at a foreign seaport i (i.e., di is high), then physical security of sites that lead into
i should be less of a concern and vice versa (i.e., pkji is relatively low).
The general model confirms the insights gained in the single container route problem as
well. The original single container route model and its expanded version discussed in this
section do not fully identify the site chosen by the attacker for weapon insertion. Further
assumptions have to be made on technology parameters of the model to completely identify
the equilibrium strategies. Such an attempt is not made here because precise estimates of
these parameters which could help determine the exact functional relationships are difficult
to obtain. Most relevant information is classified. Bakır (2008) provides some estimates
and ranges based on open source information without defining any functional relationships,
albeit for southwestern border crossings. Nevertheless, the results of the paper provide a
very good sketch of what the equilibrium should look like.
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4 Conclusion
Port security has been a major theme in homeland security since the attacks upon the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Terrorists may target ports mainly because of their economic
significance as well as their close proximity to urban centers. Unfortunately, terrorists have
a variety of options to carry out an attack. The Department of Homeland Security has been
doing its part to reduce the likelihood of such a successful attack by enhancing cargo and
physical security. Despite significant progress since September 11, loopholes are still re-
ported to exist. This paper addresses cargo related aspects of port security and analyzes the
resource allocation problem across various layers of the container transportation.
The results of the general model provide some insights about an effective defense against
an adaptive adversary. The attacker’s strategy is to maximize the probability of a success-
ful attack. Hence, the choice of location for weapon insertion should be where the phys-
ical security could be breached most easily. In response, the defender has to maintain an
equal security level at container transfer facilities, loading stations, warehouses and truck
rest areas on the most vulnerable container route to maximize the return on investment. Se-
curity on other container routes should be balanced between non-intrusive inspections at
foreign seaports and physical security. In this regard, the defender has some flexibility in
allocating security resources as well. If increasing non-intrusive inspection capability over-
seas is an effective way to detect weapons of mass disruption, physical security of sites
visited during land transportation may receive less emphasis. However, if the implementa-
tion of non-intrusive inspections overseas face challenges due to local concerns of slower
port operations, physical security in land transportation becomes crucial to cargo container
security.
The model accounts for the possibility of an attack before the authorities get a chance to
inspect the container at the domestic port. This reduces the effectiveness of domestic seaport
security. The value of improving security at domestic ports depends on the probability that
the attacker can detonate the weapon remotely soon after the containerized weapon reaches
its target. A higher probability of success for the attacker reduces equilibrium probability
of interdiction maintained at a domestic seaport. In this case, the defender should shift re-
sources to improve early interdiction capabilities.
Vulnerability of each location on the container route and the change in the probability of
interdiction for a given amount of security spending vary. Nevertheless, the results provide
valuable insights. The Department of Homeland Security recognizes the adaptive nature of
terrorists. With this recognition, various programs and initiatives have been introduced over
the years. However, high number of inbound containers and the difficulty in enforcing secu-
rity standards at foreign sites may in practice make it difficult to implement optimal resource
allocation decisions. A coordinated and a sincere effort by all nations and the private sector
is required to implement high security standards to reduce the threat.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 The determinant of the 3 × 3 upper left submatrix and the entire
Hessian is computed as follows. First, the 3 × 3 upper left submatrix is
⎡
⎣
∂2L/∂p2
i′ ∂
2L/∂pi′∂q ∂2L/∂pi′∂d1
∂2L/∂q∂pi′ ∂2L/∂q2 ∂2L/∂q∂d1
∂2L/∂d1∂pi′ ∂2L/∂d1∂q ∂2L/∂d21
⎤
⎦ .
The determinant is
∂2L/∂p2i′ ·
[
∂2L/∂q2 · ∂2L/∂d21 −
(
∂2L/∂q∂d1
)2] − ∂2L/∂pi′∂q ·
[
∂2L/∂q∂pi′ · ∂2L/∂d21
− ∂2L/∂q∂d1 · ∂2L/∂d1∂pi′
] + ∂2L/∂pi′∂d1 ·
[
∂2L/∂q∂pi′ · ∂2L/∂d1∂q
− ∂2L/∂q2 · ∂2L/∂d1∂pi′
]
= αi′ · (αi′ + 1) · (1 − pi′)−(αi′ +2) ·
[
β · (β + 1) · (1 − q)−(β+2)
·γ1 · (γ1 + 1) · (1 − d1)−(γ1+2) − (1 − pi′)2 ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2 · e2]
− (1 − d1) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e · [(1 − d1) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e · γ1
· (γ1 + 1) · (1 − d1)−(γ1+2) − (1 − p1) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2 · e2 · (1 − q)]
+ (1 − q) · [s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e · [(1 − d1) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2
· e2 · (1 − pi′) − β · (β + 1) · (1 − q)−(β+1) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e].
Using first order conditions ∂L
∂pi′
= ∂L
∂q
= ∂L
∂d1
= ∂L
∂d
= 0, and simplifying the expression
= (1 − d1) · (1 − q) · (1 − pi′) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]3 · e3
· [αi′βγ1 + αi′β + αi′γ1 + βγ1],
which is positive. Next, the determinant of the entire Hessian is
∂2L
∂p2
i′
· ∂
2L
∂q2
·
(
∂2L
∂d21
· ∂
2L
∂d2
−
(
∂2L
∂d1∂d
)2)
− ∂
2L
∂p2
i′
· ∂
2L
∂q∂d1
·
(
∂2L
∂d1∂q
· ∂
2L
∂d2
− ∂
2L
∂d1∂d
· ∂
2L
∂d∂q
)
+ ∂
2L
∂p2
i′
· ∂
2L
∂q∂d
·
(
∂2L
∂d1∂q
· ∂
2L
∂d1∂d
− ∂
2L
∂d21
· ∂
2L
∂d∂q
)
−
(
∂2L
∂pi′∂q
)2
·
(
∂2L
∂d21
· ∂
2L
∂d2
−
(
∂2L
∂d1∂d
)2)
+ ∂
2L
∂pi′∂q
· ∂
2L
∂q∂d1
·
(
∂2L
∂d1∂p1
· ∂
2L
∂d2
− ∂
2L
∂d1∂d
· ∂
2L
∂d∂p1
)
− ∂
2L
∂pi′∂q
· ∂
2L
∂q∂d
·
(
∂2L
∂d1∂pi′
· ∂
2L
∂d∂d1
− ∂
2L
∂d21
· ∂
2L
∂d∂pi′
)
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+ ∂
2L
∂pi′∂d1
· ∂
2L
∂q∂pi′
·
(
∂2L
∂d1∂q
· ∂
2L
∂d2
− ∂
2L
∂d1∂d
· ∂
2L
∂d∂q
)
− ∂
2L
∂pi′∂d1
· ∂
2L
∂q2
·
(
∂2L
∂d1∂pi′
· ∂
2L
∂d2
− ∂
2L
∂d1∂d
· ∂
2L
∂d∂pi′
)
+ ∂
2L
∂pi′∂d1
· ∂
2L
∂q∂d
·
(
∂2L
∂d1∂pi′
· ∂
2L
∂d∂q
− ∂
2L
∂d1∂q
· ∂
2L
∂d∂pi′
)
− ∂
2L
∂pi′∂d
· ∂
2L
∂q∂pi′
·
(
∂2L
∂d1∂q
· ∂
2L
∂d∂d1
− ∂
2L
∂d21
· ∂
2L
∂d∂q
)
+ ∂
2L
∂pi′∂d
· ∂
2L
∂q2
·
(
∂2L
∂d1∂pi′
· ∂
2L
∂d∂d1
− ∂
2L
∂d21
· ∂
2L
∂d∂pi′
)
− ∂
2L
∂pi′∂d
· ∂
2L
∂q∂d1
·
(
∂2L
∂d1∂pi′
· ∂
2L
∂d∂q
− ∂
2L
∂d1∂q
· ∂
2L
∂d∂pi′
)
.
Using f (pi′) = (1 − pi′)−(αi′ +2), g(q) = (1 − q)−(β+2), h(d1) = (1 − d1)−(γ1+2), and t (d) =
(1 − d)−(γ+2), the determinant expression is
= αi′ · (αi′ + 1) · f (pi′) · β · (β + 1) · g(q) · γ1 · (γ1 + 1) · h(d1) · γ · (γ + 1) · t (d)
+ 2 · αi′ · (αi′ + 1) · f (pi′) · (1 − pi′)3 · (1 − s)2 · ρ2 · (1 − q) · (1 − d1)
· [s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e3
+ 2 · γ · (γ + 1) · t (d) · (1 − pi′) · (1 − q) · (1 − d1) ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]3 · e3
+ 2 · γ1 · (γ1 + 1) · h(d1) · (1 − pi′) · (1 − s)2 · ρ2 · (1 − q) · (1 − d1)3
· [s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e3
+ 2 · β · (β + 1) · g(q) · (1 − pi′) · (1 − s)2 · ρ2 · (1 − q)3 · (1 − d1)
· [s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ] · e3
− 3 · (1 − pi′)2 · (1 − s)2 · ρ2 · (1 − q)2 · (1 − d1)2 ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2 · e4
− αi′ · (αi′ + 1) · f (pi′) · β · (β + 1) · g(q) · (1 − pi′)2 · (1 − s)2 · ρ2 · (1 − q)2 · e2
− αi′ · (αi′ + 1) · f (pi′) · γ · (γ + 1) · t (d) · (1 − pi′)2 ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2 · e2
− αi′ · (αi′ + 1) · f (pi′) · γ1 · (γ1 + 1) · h(d1) · (1 − pi′)2 · (1 − s)2 · ρ2 · (1 − d1)2 · e2
− γ1 · (γ1 + 1) · h(d1) · γ · (γ + 1) · t (d) · (1 − d1)2 ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2 · e2
− β · (β + 1) · g(q) · γ · (γ + 1) · t (d) · (1 − q)2 · [s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2 · e2
− β · (β + 1) · g(q) · γ1 · (γ1 + 1) · h(d1) · (1 − q)2 · (1 − s)2 · ρ2 · (1 − d1)2 · e2.
Beyond this point, major steps of this computation include the use of first order conditions
to simplify the expression to obtain,
det(H) = (αi′γ1βγ + αi′γ1β + αi′γ1γ + αi′βγ + γ1βγ ) · (1 − pi′)2 · (1 − q)2
· (1 − d1)2 · (1 − s) · ρ ·
([
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]3/(1 − d)) · e4
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+ (αi′β + αi′γ1 + γ1β) ·
[
(1 − pi′)2 · (1 − q)2 · (1 − d1)2 · (1 − s) · ρ
· ([s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]3/(1 − d)) · e4 − (1 − pi′)2 · (1 − q)2
· (1 − d1)2 · (1 − s)2 · ρ2 ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2 · e4].
The first term is positive. The second term is also positive if and only if the term in brackets
is also positive. One can rewrite the term in the brackets as,
(1 − pi′)2 · (1 − q)2 · (1 − d1)2 · (1 − s) · ρ ·
[
s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]2 · e4
· (([s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]/(1 − d)) − (1 − s) · ρ). (10)
It is easy to see that (10) is also positive because ([s + (1 − s) · (1 − d) · ρ]/(1 − d)) >
(1 − s) · ρ. This proves that the Hessian is positive definite. 
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